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I. INTRODUCTION
The slated expiration of the Bush Administration's tax cuts in
2010 highlights the instability of the current 15% rate on dividends
and capital gains. Meanwhile, pressure has mounted to reduce U.S.
Cf. Henry M. Paulson, Our Broken Corporate Tax Code, WALL ST. J., July 19,
2007, at A15.
' Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
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corporate tax rates to improve competitiveness in an increasingly
global economy. Much of the 1986 Act reform of the corporate tax-
base-broadening combined with lower rates-has unraveled, leaving
the United States with a high statutory corporate tax rate and narrow
corporate tax base.' Despite renewed interest in base-broadening and
loophole-closing, the goal of corporate tax reform remains elusive. On
one hand, the Administration appears to favor increased expensing of
investment as an incremental step toward fundamental tax reform
On the other hand, current legislative proposals would broaden the
corporate tax base and reduce the maximum corporate tax rate.3 Thus
far, proponents of corporate tax reform have largely sidestepped the
controversial issue of whether the 2003 tax cuts on dividends and
capital gains should be made permanent. Given the importance of the
relationship between the maximum individual and corporate tax rates,
the issue of corporate tax reform cannot be divorced from the issue of
whether to extend the 2003 tax cuts and the accompanying revenue
and distributional concerns.
Although the direction of corporate tax reform remains uncertain,
current proposals should be viewed in light of the overall decline of
the corporate tax as well as the strange transformation of the
Administration's ill-fated 2003 dividend-exclusion proposal.4 This
article proceeds in three parts. The first part discusses the long-term
decline in the role of the corporate tax in raising federal revenues and
enhancing progressivity. Part two discusses how the Administration's
2003 proposal to eliminate double-level corporate taxation morphed
into an unstable legislative compromise based on tax-rate parity for
dividends and capital gains. Part three considers two contrasting
alternative goals reflected in current proposals for reform of business
taxation: reduced corporate tax rates and enhanced expensing of new
I See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Unraveling, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71,
81-82 (2007).
2 See generally OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007) [hereinafter TREASURY APPROACHES]. The report is a
follow-up to the Treasury's conference on competitiveness in July 2007 and its earlier
background paper. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON
BUSINESS TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS: BACKGROUND PAPER 14
(2007) [hereinafter TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER].
See, e.g., Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. §
3001 (2007).
4 See generally Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533 (2007); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning
Slogans Into Tax Policy, 27 VA. TAX REV. 747 (2008).
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investment. The article concludes that 1986-style base-broadening and
reduced rates would improve competitiveness and limit tax sheltering
opportunities, although a political consensus for such reform will be
hard to forge and additional sources of revenue may be required to
finance significant rate reductions.
II. DECLINE OF THE CORPORATE TAX
A. Long-Term Decline
Over the last half century, the corporate tax has declined
significantly as a source of federal revenue and as a percentage of
GDP. While corporate taxes accounted for nearly 30% of total federal
revenues and 5.6% of GDP in 1953, by 2003 corporate taxes
accounted for 7% of total federal revenues and 1.2% of GDP.5 The
decline of the corporate tax has been accompanied by increased
reliance on the individual income and payroll taxes to fund revenue
needs. The shrinking role of the corporate tax is the outcome of
several factors-most notably, the expansion of S corporations and
partnerships, which accounted for 36% of business net income in
2004.6 The popularity of passthrough entities is attributable largely to
the ability to avoid corporate-level taxes while retaining limited
liability. Since high-bracket taxpayers receive a disproportionate
share of passthrough income, recent reductions in individual income
tax rates have significantly benefitted this group of business owners.8
5 See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Tax: Where Has It Been and Where Is It
Going, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 903, 903-04 (2004). Corporate tax revenues temporarily
spiked in 2006, but are expected to settle around 2% of GDP and 9% of total federal
revenue. See id. at 904; see also Alan J. Auerbach, Why Have Corporate Revenues
Declined? Another Look, 53 CESIFo ECON. STUD. 153, 153-54 (2007). The CBO
recently revised downward its estimate of corporate tax revenues as a percentage of
GDP. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
FISCAL YEARS 2008 TO 2018, at 92-93 (2008) [hereinafter CBO, BUDGET OUTLOOK]
(projecting corporate tax revenue declining to around 1.7% of GDP by 2018).
6 Between 1980 and 2004, S corporations increased their share of business net
income from 1% to 15%, while partnerships increased their share from 3% to 21%;
during the same period, the share of sole proprietorships declined from 17% to 14%.
See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 14.
7 Between 1980 and 2004, the noncorporate sector's share of net business
income increased from 22% to 50%. See id. at 13. In 2004, the 17,500 largest C
corporations generated nearly half of business net income and paid 91% of all
corporate income taxes. See id. at 12.
8 See id. at 16 (estimating that, in 2007, "84 percent of the tax reduction from
the top rate reduction will go to flow-through business owners").
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Beginning in the 1990's, the corporate tax has also been undermined
by the explosion of tax shelters and aggressive tax planning,
innovation in financial instruments, and migration of income abroad.9
These developments give rise to concerns that the corporate tax may
no longer serve as a secure and robust source of federal revenue.
B. Role of Corporate Tax
The decline of the corporate tax may undermine the progressivity
of the tax system overall. While the ultimate incidence of the
corporate tax remains hotly contested, traditional analysis generally
assumes that the burden is borne by all owners of capital, rather than
solely by corporate shareholders.'0  Because aggregate capital
ownership is more concentrated among higher-income taxpayers than
labor income or consumption, the corporate tax may be viewed as
contributing to overall progressivity. The corporate tax would appear
even more progressive if the burden were allocated entirely to
shareholders, since this group is more affluent than owners of capital
as a whole." A recent study suggests that the "dramatic drop in
progressivity [since the 1960's] at the upper end of the income
distribution is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and to a
lesser extent estate and gift taxes, both of which fall on capital
9 Tax shelter activity is viewed as playing a significant role in the gap between
corporate "book" and "tax" income. See generally Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence
Between Book Income and Tax Income, 17 TAX POL'Y AND THE ECON. 169 (James M.
Poterba ed., 2003).
10 For example, the CBO allocates corporate tax liabilities to households in
proportion to their shares of capital income. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 TO 2005, at 3 (2007) [hereinafter
CBO, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES]. For an alternative approach
assigning the bulk of the corporate tax burden to labor, see TREASURY APPROACHES,
supra note 2, at 30-33, 52-53; see also infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
1 At the opposite extreme, the corporate tax would appear regressive if the
burden were allocated entirely to labor. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How
Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective,
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7-8 (2007) (describing as a "middle-ground assumption"
allocation of the corporate tax burden to capital income generally). See generally Alan
J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11686, 2005). For an international
perspective, see Mihir A. Desai et al., Labor and Capital Shares of the Corporate Tax
Burden: International Evidence (2007), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/mdesai/
PDFs/Labor%20and%20Capital.pdf (suggesting the corporate tax burden is shared
between labor and capital).
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income."12 The 2003 tax cuts have further reduced the total tax burden
on corporate-source income.
In addition to raising revenue and enhancing progressivity, the
corporate tax may also play an important role in backstopping the
individual income tax. 3 Whenever the maximum corporate tax rate is
lower than the maximum individual tax rate-as was the case before
1986-individuals can potentially enhance after-tax returns by
investing through corporations and deferring realization of accrued
gains. To the extent that shareholder-level gains are taxed at
preferential rates (or may escape tax altogether if the stock is held
until death), the combined burden of the double-level tax may often
not be significantly greater than a single-level individual tax levied at
ordinary income rates. The 1986 Act lessened the attractiveness of
sheltering by raising the maximum corporate tax rate above the
maximum individual rate and taxing both dividends and capital gains
at ordinary income rates. The restoration of a capital gains preference
in the 1990's-and even more significantly the 2003 tax cuts-may
render sheltering once again attractive. The problem of sheltering
would be exacerbated if, in the future, corporate tax rates are reduced
without any corresponding change in dividend and capital gain tax
rates. The current preferential 15% rate may also encourage financial
engineering and conversion of returns to labor into tax-favored
dividends and capital gain, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness of
the overall income tax.
C. Economic Distortions
The existence of a separate corporate tax has long been criticized
as causing economic distortions, which are exacerbated to the extent
that, for a given level of revenue, corporate tax preferences imply
higher corporate tax rates. Significantly, the corporate tax tends to
penalize investment in corporate rather than noncorporate form and
to favor debt over equity. The Congressional Budget Office has
recently estimated that the combined corporate-level and individual-
12 Piketty & Saez, supra note 11, at 22-23.
13 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE,
FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 111 (2008) (noting that
the "the primary justification for a separate tax on corporate incomes is as a
complement to the individual income tax"). Historically, double taxation may be
viewed as "the result of the retained earnings problem rather than its cause." Steven
A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from
History, 56 TAx L. REV. 463, 532 (2003).
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level effective tax rate-the effective total tax rate (ETTR)-on
marginal corporate investments is around 26.3%, compared to the
statutory maximum rate of 35% on corporate-level income alone.1
4
Investment in the noncorporate sector is taxed even more lightly,
since the effective tax rate is only around 20.6%.15 While the ETTR on
corporate equity-financed investments is 36.1% (slightly above the
35% statutory rate because of investor-level taxes), the rate on
corporate debt-financed investments is actually negative 6.4% (a
difference of 42.5 percentage points). 16 Debt-financed investments are
subsidized because corporations may deduct accelerated depreciation
and the nominal amount of interest (including an inflation premium);
the benefit of the corporate deduction is not fully offset by taxes
levied on interest recipients who may be lightly taxed (or not taxed at
all). Significant differences in the tax burdens across different classes
of assets reflect the magnitude of bonuses (or penalties) generated by
accelerated depreciation and various investment subsidies.17 While the
2003 tax cuts may ameliorate the uneven treatment of
corporate/noncorporate investments and debt/equity investments,
alternative reforms might well have proved less costly and more
efficient.
Under a well-designed system of corporate-shareholder
integration, all corporate income would be taxed once (and only once)
at nonpreferential rates. 8 Under the current system, some corporate
14 The 26.3% figure reflects a weighted average for a typical mix of debt and
equity financing, as calculated by the CBO. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
COMPUTING EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL 46-47 (2006); U.S. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECrIVE RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM
7, 8 tbl.1 (2005) [hereinafter CBO, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME]. The effective tax rate
measures investment incentives based on future cash flows from a hypothetical
investment that is assumed to break even (after payment of all taxes). The CBO
computed effective tax rates based on the assumption that the 2001 and 2003 changes
would be made permanent. See id. at 6-7.
15 See id. at 8 tbl.1.
16 See id. Under a fully integrated system, if taxes were imposed only on real
economic profits (ignoring inflation), the tax rate on debt-financed investment would
be zero, while the tax rate on equity-financed investment would be the statutory rate
of 35%.
17 See id. at 10-11 tbl.2. While Congress liberalized expensing in 2001 and 2003,
it did not address depreciation allowances, which account for most of the variation
across assets. Partial expensing played a significant role in the decline in average
corporate tax rates in 2002-2004. See CBO, BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 5, at 95
(noting that average corporate tax rates fell to 15% in 2004 and remained near that
level through 2004).
'8 See generally Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of
[Vol. 28:341
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income is taxed twice (both at the corporate and shareholder level),
some is taxed only once (at either the corporate or shareholder level),
and some is never taxed at all (or taxed only at preferential rates).
More than half of all dividends are effectively not taxed at the
individual level because they flow to tax-exempt entities, such as
pension plans and 401(k)s."9 While integration is generally perceived
as offering potential efficiency gains, the magnitude of such gains
would depend crucially upon the manner in which integration is
implemented. Such efficiency gains would also need to be balanced
against concerns about revenue loss and distributional issues. The
revenue cost would be reduced to the extent that integration provided
an impetus for serious reform aimed at broadening the corporate tax
base and reducing or eliminating corporate tax preferences. While
integration itself would tend to make the tax system less progressive,
Congress could adjust tax rates to ensure any desired level of
progressivity. Indeed, elimination of double taxation of corporate
earnings could be combined with taxing capital gains at ordinary-
income rates to the extent not attributable to previously taxed
corporate income.2" While such an approach would be broadly
progressive and potentially raise revenue," it bears little resemblance
to the President Bush's 2003 integration proposal and even less to the
legislation enacted.
III. 2003 TAX CUTS: THE FIFTEEN PERCENT SOLUTION
A. Integration Proposal
In early 2003, the Bush Administration introduced a warmed-over
version of earlier Treasury proposals for corporate-shareholder
Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to the Issues, in
INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTS 3 (Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr. eds., 1998).
19 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, The Administration's Proposal to Cut
Dividend and Capital Gains Taxes, 98 TAX NOTES 415, 416 (Jan. 20, 2003).
20 See Emil Sunley, Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L.
REV. 621, 643 (1992).
21 To the extent that "the most compelling argument for lower capital gains tax
rates on corporate stocks is as an offset to double taxation," elimination of double
taxation would leave "no good reason to retain a tax preference for capital gains."
Leonard E. Burman, Taxing Capital Income Once, 98 TAX NOTES 751, 751-52 (Feb. 3,
2003).
22 See id. at 754.
20081
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23integration. The 2003 proposal was promoted as a temporary
stimulus measure that would boost stock market prices, improve
corporate governance by encouraging dividend distributions, and
24eliminate unfairness to investors penalized by double taxation. In
addition, the Treasury touted the proposal as an anti-tax shelter
measure.25  Constrained by budget pressures and political
crosscurrents, the Administration was unable to realize its ambitious
goal of eliminating double taxation. Instead, what emerged from a
tortuous legislative process was a temporary reduction in the tax rate
on dividends and capital gains, which President Bush signed into law
as part of the 2003 Act.2' Although the 2003 tax cuts were originally
slated to expire in 2008, they were subsequently extended until 2010.21
The Administration's integration proposal provided for an
exclusion at the shareholder level only for dividends paid from income
previously taxed at the corporate level; dividends from nontaxed
28corporate income would have remained taxable as ordinary income.
23 The Administration borrowed the substance of its dividend exclusion proposal
from a 1992 Treasury Department study. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 11-22 (2003) [hereinafter FY 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS]; U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS:
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992). For a fuller discussion of the
Administration's proposals and their policy implications, see Burke & McCouch,
supra note 4, at 762-81; Bank, supra note 4.
24 See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L.J. 845, 845
(2005). Critics predicted that the proposal would have little impact on stock prices
and would be unlikely to be effective as a stimulus measure; the bulk of any
additional dividends would likely end up in the hands of high-income investors who
tend to save rather than spend. See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Dividend Tax Relief
Effects on Economic Recovery, Long-Term Growth, and the Stock Market (Cong. Res.
Serv., Report No. RL31824, 2007); id. at 2-3 (describing dividend tax relief as "one of
the least effective tax cuts for encouraging investment spending").
25 See FY 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that proposal
would "reduce incentives for certain types of corporate planning" because
"shareholders will be exempt from tax only on distributions of previously taxed
corporate income").
26 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, §
302, 117 Stat. 752 (2003) (amending I.R.C. § 1(h) and reducing maximum rate on
dividends and capital gain to 15%). Congress considered but failed to adopt the
Administration's original proposals. See H.R. 2, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003); S. 2, 108th
Cong. § 201 (2003).
27 See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).
28 See FY 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 23, at 13-15 (describing
"excludable dividend amount"). To preserve neutrality between distributed and
[Vol. 28:341
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Thus, in the simplest case where earnings were fully taxed at the
corporate level, the Administration's proposal generally achieved
parity between distributed and retained earnings and eliminated any
shareholder-level tax. If corporate income were fully (or partially)
sheltered, however, the proposal did not neutralize the advantage to
shareholders of extracting such earnings at preferential capital gain
rates. A dividend distribution of fully-sheltered corporate earnings
would attract an ordinary-income tax at the shareholder-level, since
the dividend would be entirely includible. By contrast, if the same
fully-sheltered corporate earnings were distributed in the form of a
share repurchase, the distribution would attract a lower capital gain
tax, leaving the shareholder with a higher after-tax amount. Since
shareholders can extract corporate earnings through stock sales (or
nondividend distributions treated as stock sales), the Administration's
proposal was thus unlikely to have any significant effect on the tax-
minimizing strategy of sheltering, retention, and repurchase."
B. Fifteen Percent Solution
Whatever its merits as a corporate integration measure, the
Administration's proposal failed to attract support from any major
political constituency. 0 Instead, the proposal met resistance from
business groups who saw it as complex, burdensome, and inimical to
corporate-level tax preferences. Under pressure from Republican
deficit hawks, Senate Finance Chairman Grassley agreed to limit the
cost of any tax package in conference to $350 billion-less than half
the amount sought by the Administration. Grassley reported a bill
that included a pared-down dividend exclusion coupled with several
corporate tax offsets. By the narrowest possible margin, a last-minute
amendment by Senator Nickles prevailed on the Senate floor, which
was far more costly than the modest exclusion in Grassley's original
bill. While the Nickles "disappearing dividend exclusion" allowed the
retained earnings, shareholders would be permitted to increase the basis of their stock
to reflect a ratable share of fully-taxed retained earnings. See id. at 14 (describing
"retained earnings basis adjustment").
29 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 19, at 420 (suggesting that "an increase... in
the effective tax rate on accruing capital gains" would be needed to achieve the
Administration's "ostensible goals").
30 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 4, at 772-76 (describing morphing of
integration proposal in legislative process); Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise
and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 576 (2007) (describing result as a
"compromise outcome").
2008]
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Administration to claim victory of sorts," it was clear that the
Administration had lost the support of key business groups who threw
their support behind the House bill which abandoned any pretense of
integration in favor of a straightforward tax rate cut for dividends and
capital gains. The "15% solution" advocated by House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Thomas offered a "politically potent
combination of tax cuts that benefited investors without jeopardizing
existing corporate tax preferences. 32 In the end, the conference
committee followed the House bill; by terminating the tax cuts at the
end of 2008, the conferees brought the overall revenue cost down to
$350 billion.33
C. Unstable Compromise
The legislation that emerged in 2003 is both bizarre and
inherently unstable. Congress enacted a 15% rate for dividends
regardless of whether such dividends were previously taxed at the
corporate level. Simultaneously, in the guise of reducing double
taxation of corporate earnings, Congress reduced the rate on all
capital gains whether or not such gains are derived from retained
34
earnings. If tax-rate parity for dividends and capital gains were
indeed perceived as permanent, it would be necessary to address the
underlying premise of corporate tax provisions designed primarily to
prevent bailout of corporate earnings at favorable capital gain rates.
These anti-bailout provisions no longer serve much, if any, purpose,
except potentially to defer recovery of basis. Far from making the tax
system simpler and more efficient, the 2003 tax cuts open up fresh
opportunities for tax avoidance and invite financial technicians to
discover new ways to convert compensation, interest, and other
ordinary income into tax-favored dividends.
The Administration's arguments for permanent extension of the
2003 tax cuts ignore the potentially significant differences between the
effects of a temporary dividend tax cut and those of a permanent tax
31 The Administration's apparent support for the Nickles provision caused
consternation even among stalwart supporters. See BRUCE BARTLETT, IMPOSTOR:
How GEORGE W. BUSH BANKRUPTED AMERICA AND BETRAYED THE REAGAN
LEGACY 61 (2006) (noting that even supporters were baffled by the Administration's
insistence on "making dividends fully tax-free even if only for a single year, in hopes
that it could extend the provision in later years").
32 Burke & McCouch, supra note 4, at 774.
33 Id.
34See Graetz, supra note 1, at 84.
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cut. A temporary dividend tax cut has the perverse effect of
encouraging dividend payouts in anticipation of an expected future
rate increase.35 Thus, for example, if the 2003 dividend tax cut is
perceived as temporary, investors have an incentive to withdraw funds
from corporate solution while the 15% rate remains in effect and the
incentive becomes stronger as it becomes more likely that the 15%
rate will be allowed to expire. The sunset provisions, combined with
ever-increasing federal budget deficits, create an unstable fiscal
situation which may require increases in both dividend and capital
gain rates. If future capital gain rates are perceived as likely to rise
above the current dividend tax rate, the bias toward current
distributions may outweigh the advantages of sheltering, retention,
and repurchase. The net result of the 2003 Act would then be to offer
shareholders a one-time opportunity to extract corporate earnings on
preferential terms with no adequate compensatory corporate-level
tax. 36
The Administration pressed for extension of the 2003 tax cuts
based on incomplete and potentially misleading claims that the cuts
had unleashed an "unprecedented" surge in dividend payouts, raised
stock prices, and stimulated economic growth.37 In announcing
unexpectedly high collections of corporate and individual taxes in its
2006 mid-year review, the Office of Management and Budget credited
the 2003 tax cuts with "stimulating and sustaining a strong
economy., 38 The 2006 spike in tax revenues reflected the expanding
share of pre-tax income going to corporations and wealthy individuals
39
who pay tax at a higher rate than average earners. In fact, any
suggestion that the 2003 tax cuts are "paying for themselves" is
inherently implausible. Even the Treasury's own dynamic analysis
shows that the tax cuts have only modest potential to increase growth
over a lengthy period, even assuming drastic spending cuts starting in
35 See Bank, supra note 4, at 573 (noting that in the absence of tax rate parity
between current and future distributions, the 2003 Act "offered firms an incentive to
distribute dividends currently").
36 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 4, at 778-79.
37 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 76 (2005); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 125-26 (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN AMERICA'S
FUTURE 9-10 (2006).
38 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MID-SESSION REVIEW: BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT 2, FISCAL YEAR 2007, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budgetlfy2007/pdf/O7msr.pdf.
39 See Greg Ip & Deborah Solomon, As Bigger Piece of Economic Pie Shifts to
Wealthiest, U.S. Deficit Heads Downward, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at A2.
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2017.40 Had the Treasury's dynamic analysis not ignored the impact of
debt financing, even these modest potential gains would have
• 41
disappeared.
Assessing the effectiveness of dividend relief on enhanced
investment depends critically upon whether one accepts the
"traditional view" or the "new view" of dividend taxation. The
Treasury adheres to the traditional view under which dividend relief
would lower effective tax rates on corporate investments and
42
strengthen the overall incentive to save and invest. By contrast,
under the new view, dividend relief does little to stimulate overall
investment and savings; rather than increasing incentives for
corporate investment, it produces a windfall gain to existing
shareholders by raising stock prices. Both of these views depend upon
unsettled assumptions concerning corporate financing and the effect
• 43
of dividend taxes on marginal investments. To the extent that the old
view and new view may be consistent with the behavior of different
segments of firms in the economy, the ability of dividend relief to
influence overall investment decisions is attenuated."4 If the 2003 tax
cuts are eventually financed through tax increases (rather than
spending cuts), they would wind up reducing future growth.
While the long-run economic effects of the 2003 tax cuts may
largely depend on offsetting future changes in taxes and spending,
investor-level relief clearly skews benefits to upper-income
40 See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A DYNAMIC
ANALYSIS OF PERMANENT EXTENSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S TAX RELIEF 13-14 (2006)
[hereinafter TREASURY DYNAMIC ANALYSIS].
41 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax
Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1204 (2004)
(noting that even supporters of the 2003 tax cuts acknowledged that efficiency gains
were "likely to be small"); Jane G. Gravelle, Effects of Dividend Relief on Economic
Growth, the Stock Market, and Corporate Tax Preferences, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 653, 667
(2003) (concluding that "long run growth effects [of the dividend exclusion proposal]
are negative if it is deficit-financed (and may be negative even if it is not)").
42 See TREASURY DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 8.
43 Under the new view, the burden of the corporate tax is assumed to be
capitalized in the price of stock, so that lifting dividend taxes represents a windfall to
existing shareholders. The new view holds that dividend taxes burden only the
relatively small share of corporate investment funded through new shares rather than
retained earnings. See Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, On the Marginal Source
of Investment Funds, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 205, 216 (2003) (noting the new view's
prediction that "the level of dividend taxes has no impact on the incentive to invest or
pay dividends").
44 See TREASURY DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 40, at 8.
45 See id. at 13-14.
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taxpayers. 6 Any modest efficiency gains are outweighed by the
regressive nature of the tax cuts and their impact on budget deficits.
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation's most recent tax
expenditure analysis, preferential rates on dividends and capital gains
represent the single largest tax expenditure ($631.9 billion) in the
federal budget for fiscal years 2007-2011. 47 The cost of extending the
15% dividend rate alone is over $216.5 billion for fiscal years 2008-
2018, while extending the 15% capital gain rate adds another $101.5
billion for fiscal years 2008-2018. 48 Since the share of capital income
received by the top 1% has become increasingly concentrated, the
lower rates on dividends and capital gains are likely now more
regressive than ever.49 By providing investor-level relief, the
Administration arguably chose the most regressive form of reducing
the overall corporate tax burden. °
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Structural reform of business taxation is once again on the
46 In 2004, the top 2% of tax returns had 57% of taxable dividends and 79% of
taxable capital gains. See Jane G. Gravelle, Distributional Effects of Taxes on
Corporate Profits, Investment Income and Estates 2 (Cong. Res. Serv., Report No.
RL32517, 2007). The top .5% of tax returns had 42% of taxable dividends and 65% of
taxable capital gains. See id. The top 1% of tax returns had 32% of capital income and
11% of labor income. See id. at 5 ("[C]apital income taxes contribute to the
progressivity of the tax system, even if they are applied at a flat rate (as is essentially
the case of the corporate tax).").
47 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 28 (Joint Comm. Print 2007). The
tax expenditure exceeds the cost of the exclusion of employer payments for health
insurance ($628.5 billion) and the net exclusion of pension contributions and net
earnings of employer plans ($607.3 billion) for 2007-2011. See id. at 33-34.
48 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL
311 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). Repeal of the estate tax would cost another $670
billion for fiscal years 2008-2018. See id.
49 The CBO data suggests that nearly one third of the total federal taxes paid by
the top 1% of households was attributable to their share of corporate taxes in 2004
and 2005. See CBO, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES, supra note 10, at
5. See id. at 6 (allocating nearly three fifths of total corporate taxes to the top 1% of
households in 2004 and 2005).
.50 Although the two types of reforms may be economically equivalent, a
corporate-level tax cut is generally assigned to all owners of capital, whereas an
investor-level tax cut is assigned to owners of corporate equity. See LEONARD E.
BURMAN ET AL., TOWARD A MORE CONSISTENT DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 232-33
(2005).
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political agenda, driven by two divergent concerns. On one hand,
reform of business taxation implicates concerns about tax equity and
the search for revenue to offset budget deficits and help pay for
reform of the individual income tax and the alternative minimum tax
(AMT). 1 On the other hand, there is impetus for cutting business
taxes based on concerns about the competitiveness of U.S. firms,
particularly in light of rate cuts abroad and shifting of U.S. corporate
profits to low-tax countries. While these two crosscurrents could
converge around reforms involving base-broadening and rate
reductions, the political environment for such reforms is much less
favorable than in 1986. Constrained by the goal of revenue neutrality,
the 1986 Act reforms were actually aimed at increasing expected
revenues from the corporate tax, through lower rates on a broader
base, to finance individual tax cuts." Although current opportunities
for base-broadening exist, internationalization may impose significant
53
constraints on the use of the corporate tax to raise revenue.
Moreover, given the need for additional revenue to fund existing
government programs and the expected future burdens imposed by an
aging society, the goal of revenue neutrality itself may be unrealistic.
A. Rangel Proposal
Current proposals indicate support across a broad political
spectrum for cutting corporate tax rates. While focused principally on
AMT relief on the individual side, the omnibus tax bill introduced by
House Ways & Means Committee Chairman Rangel in October 2007
would replace the two top corporate tax rates with a single lower rate
(30.5%) and allow increased expensing for relatively small
51 See Graetz, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that, under current law, AMT
collections will exceed collections from the regular tax by 2010). By contrast, the
corporate AMT no longer raises significant revenue and could be eliminated as part
of broad-based corporate reform; nevertheless, it would be necessary to address the
nearly $30 billion of AMT credits outstanding. See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra
note 2, at 105-06; Curtis P. Carlson, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 93: THE
CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX-AGGREGATE HISTORICAL TRENDS 2, 7
(2005) (attributing decline of the corporate AMT to changes in the AMT rules in the
1990's and temporary bonus depreciation enacted in 2002).
52 See Graetz, supra note 13, at 122 (noting that the 1986 reform was "politically
possible" because of the split within the business community between capital-
intensive industries, which desired faster depreciation write-offs, and service
companies, which benefitted from lower corporate tax rates).
53 See Graetz, supra note 1, at 85.
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S 54businesses. Taken alone, the corporate tax cuts would result in an
estimated revenue loss of $364 billion over the period 2008-2017, but
the accompanying package of revenue raisers would result in a slight
increase in overall corporate tax revenue." The single largest revenue
offset would be repeal of the section 199 deduction, enacted in 2004,
which lowers the effective tax rate for certain domestic manufacturing
activities.56 Other revenue raisers include codification of the economic1 7
substance doctrine, deferral of deductions associated with foreign-
source income that is not currently taxed,58 and a one-time change in
inventory accounting methods. The Rangel bill would also treat net
income allocated to a partner as ordinary compensation income if the
partnership holds certain types of assets and the partner provides
certain types of services.5 9
54 See Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. (2007).
See generally David L. Brumbaugh, Business Tax Issues in 2007 (Cong. Res. Serv.,
Report No. RL33890, 2007) (describing Rangel proposal); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum,
Democrat Proposes Overhaul of Taxes: Rangel Would Annul AMT, Shift Burden,
WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2007, at D01.
55 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effects of Proposals
Contained in "The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007," Fiscal Years 2008-2017,
2007 TNT 209-17 (Oct. 29, 2007).
56 When fully phased in, the section 199 deduction is equivalent to a rate
reduction of 3.15 percentage points, since only 91% of the remaining corporate
income is taxed at a 35% rate. See I.R.C. § 199(a). Although section 199 proved
irresistibly popular in Congress in 2004, it is widely viewed as inordinately complex.
See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting that section 199
requires "a completely new set of accounting distinctions" and forces nearly all
taxpayers "to make transfer pricing determinations").
57 Given the government's recent success in litigating tax shelter cases, the
estimated revenue gain ($3.8 billion over ten years) is attributable mainly to penalties
associated with codification of the economic substance doctrine.
58 By contrast, recent legislation has moved in the direction of expanding
deferral of income earned overseas. See generally Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines,
Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT'L
TAX J. 937 (2004); TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 54-65 (considering move
toward a territorial tax system that would exempt active income earned by U.S.
businesses abroad).
59 See Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 710
(2007). While the "carried interest" provision is broadly applicable, concern about the
growth of private equity firms and hedge funds operating in partnership form has
prompted proposed legislation that would classify as a corporation any publicly-
traded partnership that derives income from asset management or investment
advisory services. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND
RELATED ISSUES, 49-50 (Joint Comm. Print 2007). Exempting such entities from
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A central difference between the Rangel proposal and the 1986
compromise is that increasing corporate tax revenues is no longer a
realistic option available to pay for lower individual rates. Under the
Rangel proposal, the maximum individual rate would instead be
increased to pay for AMT relief and would significantly exceed the
60
maximum corporate tax rate. If the 2003 tax cuts on dividends and
capital gains are allowed to sunset after 2010, the capital gains rate
will be restored to 20% and qualified dividends will be taxed at
ordinary income rates. While the higher individual income tax rate
would reduce the benefits of passthrough treatment for high-income
business owners, corporate income would remain subject to potential
double taxation. Under the Rangel proposal, the combined
shareholder-level and corporate-level tax would depend on the
portion of earnings distributed as dividends and the effective capital
gain rate on share repurchases. 61 The sharp increase in the dividend
tax rate would provide a one-time incentive to bail out corporate
earnings immediately prior to the effective date of the rate change.
Thereafter, the relatively low tax rate on share repurchases would
favor retention over distribution, while the disparity between the
maximum corporate tax rate and the maximum individual income tax
rate would create shelter opportunities.
To reduce the bias in favor of retention under the Rangel
proposal, capital gains could be taxed at the same rate as dividends.
Given the ad hoc political compromise that resulted in the 15% rate
for both capital gains and dividends, supporters of the 2003 Act may
be hard pressed to justify maintaining these low rates, particularly if
61corporate tax rates are reduced. If the lower maximum corporate tax
corporate treatment could reduce future corporate tax revenue.
60 Under the Rangel proposal, the top rate on individuals would be increased to
44.2% (39.6% plus 4.6% surcharge) after 2010. See Tax Reduction and Reform Act of
2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 1021 (2007).
61 If all earnings were distributed as dividends, the maximum combined tax
burden would increase from 44.8% under current law to 61.2% after 2010. If all
earnings were retained and eventually withdrawn at capital gain rates, the maximum
combined tax burden would be somewhat lower than under current law. See Tom
Neubig & Estelle Dauchy, Rangel's Business Tax Reforms: Industry Effects by Sector,
117 TAx NOTES 873, 876 tbl. 3 (Nov. 26, 2007).
62 Although taxing both capital gains and dividends at ordinary income tax rates
would offer the greatest potential for simplification, a possible compromise would be
to tax both capital gains and dividends at 25%; thus, the tax rate on capital gains
would be increased from 20% to 25% while the tax rate on dividends would be
reduced from 39% to 25%. See Graetz, supra note 13, at 95-96 (noting that "it is not
at all clear that any revenue lost by taxing capital gains at 15 percent ... rather than
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rate is aimed at promoting international competitiveness, an argument
could be made for limiting the tax benefit to publicly-traded firms that
are most likely to compete globally. As a political matter, however, it
may be quite difficult to deny the benefit of corporate tax rate cuts to
small privately-held firms whose owners seek to avoid higher
individual rates on passthrough income." Thus, the Rangel proposal
could affect choice-of-entity decisions and revive the issue of whether
privately-held firms should be permitted to choose between the single-
tax and double-tax systems to minimize taxes.64
B. Treasury Approach
During 2007, the Treasury also turned its attention to corporate
tax reform. The Treasury's background paper, issued in July 2007,
focused primarily on efficiency issues and international comparisons.
65
After the 1986 Act, the maximum U.S. statutory corporate tax rate
was among the lowest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD); it is now one of the highest, even though
U.S. corporate tax collections as a percentage of GDP are less than
66
the OECD average. Many OECD countries have responded to tax
competition by reducing corporate tax rates and broadening the
corporate tax base. These base-broadening efforts appear generally to
have contributed significantly, despite lower rates, to stabilizing the
proportion of corporate taxes as a share of GDP.6' Thus, the simple
story of a "race to the bottom" as a result of tax competition for
say, 20 or 25 percent, is compensated for by increased savings, investment, or
economic growth").
63 If the lower tax rate on business income were available to passthrough
entities, there would be a tremendous incentive to convert wages into a distributive
share of profits, thereby reducing the tax burden on high-income business owners. Cf.
TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 50-51 (carving out business income of
passthrough entities for a "special reduced business tax rate as part of the individual
income tax"; the special rate would be set equal to the maximum corporate rate).
64 See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTER'S STUDY 45-47 (1999).
65 See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
See id. at 41 (noting that the U.S. ratio of corporate taxes to revenues (2.2%)
is below the OECD average (3.4%)); id. at 36 ("Now the United States is once again a
high corporate tax rate country.").
61 See Richard J. Vann, Trends in Company Shareholder Taxation: Single or
Double Taxation?, 88 CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONALE 21, 25-28 (2003);
see also Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: A New Era in Corporate Taxation,
110 TAX NOTES 440 (Jan. 30,2006).
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increasingly mobile capital may be too simplistic.6 The U.S. statutory
corporate tax rate (adjusted for the section 199 deduction) is virtually
identical to the average G-7 rate, and the U.S. and G-7 effective tax
rates are also quite close. 69 Thus, the data do not unambiguously
support the notion that "the U.S. is a high tax country with respect to
investment" or that it would "become so... if some reductions occur
in the future in other countries. 70 The United States has a relatively
low average corporate tax rate (corporate tax divided by corporate
profits), suggesting that the United States may have a "higher than
average level of corporate tax preferences" and a correspondingly
narrow corporate tax base.7'
If all corporate preferences were abolished, the Treasury
background paper concluded, the corporate tax rate could be cut to
around 27% or, alternatively, businesses could be allowed to expense
roughly two fifths of investment costs. 72 In a subsequent report
released in December 2007, the Treasury appeared to veer away from
a rate-cutting, base-broadening approach in favor of partial expensing• 73
of new investment. The Treasury expressed concern that a revenue-
neutral reform might fail to allow a sufficiently dramatic corporate tax
rate cut to improve U.S. international competitiveness.74  By
68 See James R. Hines, Jr., Corporate Taxation and International Competition, in
TAXING CORPORATE INCOME IN THE 21ST CENTURY 268, 268 (Alan J. Auerbach et al.
eds., 2007) (exploring the puzzle of "why growing international capital mobility has
not significantly reduced reliance on corporate income taxation").
69 Without taking into account the section 199 deduction, the U.S. statutory
corporate tax rate is 39% (including state-level taxes), while the G-7 average is 36%.
See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 35 tbl. 5.1. The United States
has an average equity-financed effective tax rate but a below average debt-financed
effective tax rate. See id. at 37-38.
70 Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hungerford, Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for
Congress 25 (Cong. Res. Serv., Report No. RL34229, 2007).
71 TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 41.
72 See id. at 7.
73 Although the Treasury report does not advocate any specific approach, its
quantitative measures suggest that partial expensing would have more significant
economic benefits than lower rates on a broader base. See TREASURY APPROACHES,
supra note 2, at ii; Martin A. Sullivan, Beyond the Conventional Wisdom: Rate Cuts
Beat Expensing, 118 TAX NOTES 456, 458-59 (Jan. 28, 2008); see also ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 83 (2007) (noting that expensing has more "bang for the
buck" than statutory rate reductions).
74 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 44 (broadening the tax base
would allow the maximum corporate rate to be reduced to 28%); see id. at iii (noting
that the United States would still have "the fifth highest tax rate" in the OECD if the
corporate tax rate were reduced to 28%). If accelerated depreciation were retained, a
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implication, paying for tax rate cuts by broadening the corporate base
might reduce or even eliminate any economic gains by increasing the
effective tax burden on capital income.75
While rate-cutting and base-broadening could be accomplished
within the existing hybrid income-tax system, the Administration
evidently prefers expensing as an incremental step toward a
76
consumption tax. Unlike the traditional emphasis on neutrality and
efficiency through low rates on a broad base, expensing would
effectively exempt the return from new investment without providing
any benefit for existing investment eligible for depreciation
deductions.77 Thus, the expensing approach focuses on boosting
capital formation rather than on enhancing competitiveness and
increasing efficiency by narrowing the range of effective tax rates on
different types of corporate investment. While suggesting that
economic gains could be significantly enhanced by reducing the
corporate tax rate even more steeply or moving toward fuller
expensing, the Treasury acknowledged that base-broadening alone
would not pay for these more ambitious reforms." Thus, the
fundamental choice would seem to be between revenue-neutral base-
broadening and an overall reduction in the tax burden on business
income, regardless of revenue neutrality. Concerns about the
Administration's commitment to revenue-neutral reform of business
taxes have been fueled by recent claims of a "free lunch" based on
behavioral responses to a significantly lower revenue-maximizing
revenue-neutral reform would permit the U.S. corporate tax rate to be reduced only
to 31%, leaving the United States with "the third highest tax rate" in the OECD. See
id. at ii-iii.
75 See id. at 44 (noting that "repeal of special tax provisions means a higher tax
burden" on investments); id. (noting that a revenue-neutral reform would likely yield
"negligible or small gains").
76 See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ANNUAL REPORT 80 (2007) [hereinafter CEA ANNUAL REPORT]
("Overall, full expensing... is an important step in the transition to a full
consumption tax.").
77 See id. Full expensing for new investment would reduce the relative value of
existing investment. See id. (describing the decline in value as "equivalent to an
unavoidable tax on existing capital [which represents] a transition cost of full
expensing").
78 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 45 (describing alternatives of
reducing the maximum corporate tax rate to 20% or allowing 65% expensing of new
investment); see also R. Glenn Hubbard, The Corporate Tax Myth. WALL ST. J., July
26, 2007, at A13 ("[E]conomically wise base-broadening alone is not likely to finance
a significant [corporate tax] rate cut.").
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corporate rate.79
Since partial expensing may be viewed as an incremental step
toward full expensing, it is instructive to consider the 2005 Advisory
Panel's tax reform proposals coupling a cash-flow business tax with an
add-on 15% tax on individual investment income.80 The add-on
investor-level tax presumably reflects a sound judgment that taxing
wages alone is not politically viable. The investor-level tax not only
fails to satisfy the consumption-tax goal of eliminating all taxes on
capital income, but also creates a significant incentive to shelter
81investment income in a business. Under the Advisory Panel's
approach, businesses would be forced to give up existing depreciation
and interest deductions in return for exemption of the normal return
on business investments (through immediate expensing), coupled with
a 30% business tax levied on risky and supranormal returns. Because
transition relief would be extremely costly, the Advisory Panel
provided only a five-year phase-out of deductions for depreciation
and interest." Thus, taxpayers with heavily debt-financed assets would
potentially lose a significant fraction of both interest and depreciation
deductions, and no relief would be provided on turnover of current
inventories. The Advisory Panel supported its claims of distributional
neutrality by modeling the business tax component (essentially a VAT
79 See Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 70, at 8 ("The issue of a Laffer curve
has not been part of the debate [over the corporate tax in the past] because the notion
of a revenue-maximizing rate other than at very high rates is inconsistent with most of
the models of the corporate tax."). Compare Chris Edwards, Is the U.S. Corporate
Tax in the Laffer Zone?, 117 TAX NOTES 1073 (Dec. 10, 2007) with Jane G. Gravelle
& Thomas L. Hungerford, The Corporate Tax Rate: Response to Edwards, 117 TAX
NOTES 1293 (Dec. 24, 2007).
80 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 158-164, 182-185
(2005) (discussing the Growth and Investment Tax, a variant of a "flat tax" with a
carve-out for wages taxed at the individual level). The Advisory Panel's principal
alternative, the so-called "Simplified Income Tax," would exclude 100% of dividends
and 75% of capital gains on stock sales. See id. at 124-25. The alternative proposal is a
political nonstarter, since it would require elimination of deductions for mortgage
interest and state and local taxes. See Graetz, supra note 1, at 87.
81 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, supra note 80,
at 182 (noting that the plan is not a "true consumption tax" because of the add-on
investor-level tax). The 15% rate would apply only to investments held outside of tax-
exempt savings accounts. See id. at 159-60.
See id. at 162-64, 172-75; Graetz, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that "tax reform
along these lines is not a practical alternative").
83 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, supra note 80,
at 172-73.
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with a subtraction for wages) "as if it were an income tax" that would
fall disproportionately on high-income taxpayers.84
Conspicuously absent from the Treasury's initial background
paper was any consideration of the distributional implications of
corporate tax reform. In its December 2007 report, the Treasury
provided two alternative sets of assumptions for the purpose of
analyzing distributional effects-one assigning the burden of the
corporate tax entirely to owners of capital and the other assigning
most of the burden to labor. According to the Treasury, the
alternative assumption reflects the "increasingly common view that a
substantial portion of the corporate income tax is borne by labor,"
building on some recent empirical studies concerning the influence of
increased international capital mobility and openness of markets."'
Based on the underlying assumption that any reforms-base-
broadening or partial expensing-would be "revenue neutral on
capital income" over the budget period, it is hardly surprising that the
Treasury found virtually no change in the overall distribution of the
federal tax burden, particularly given the small magnitude of the
corporate tax and relatively constant shares of different types of
84 Jane G. Gravelle, The Advisory Panel's Tax Reform Proposals 7-8 (Cong.
Res. Serv., Report No. RL 33545, 2006); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL
TAX REFORM, supra note 80, at 175 (claiming plan would "largely preserv[e]" the
existing distribution of the tax burden). See id. at 185-86. Replacing the corporate tax
with a subtraction-method VAT (along the lines of the Advisory Panel's proposal or
the Treasury's "business activities tax") would appear less regressive if the burden of
the corporate tax falls substantially on labor rather than solely on owners of capital.
See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 32-33.
85 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 52-53 (allocating 70% of the
corporate tax burden to labor under alternative assumption); see also CEA ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 76, at 82 (2007) ("In the long run, labor bears most of the burden
of the corporate tax."); see also Hubbard, supra note 78. Under an open-economy
model, the burden of the corporate tax could be shifted to labor because, while capital
may migrate abroad, labor is less mobile; the assumptions necessary for this outcome,
however, are quite narrow. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
86 TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 52. See id. at 31-33 (describing
recent empirical research on the relationship between cross-border variations in
corporate taxes and wages). Cf Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 70, at 29-30
(noting that recent cross-country studies purporting to show that the burden of the
corporate tax falls mainly on labor "yield unreasonable results" and "suffer from
econometric flaws"); WILLIAM W. GENTRY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 101: A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 15
(2007) (noting that "theoretical models suggest the estimated effects [of recent cross-
country studies] are implausibly large," but that "the evidence suggests rethinking the
common assumption that capital bears all of the corporate income tax").
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capital income within each income class.8' By contrast, even if a
significant portion of the corporate tax is assigned to labor, cutting
corporate taxes in isolation would be distinctly regressive based on
881
changes in after-tax income.
The Treasury's assumption that the bulk of the corporate tax
burden is borne by labor is inconsistent with the claim that the 2003
tax cuts on dividends and capital gains were needed to eliminate
unfairness to investors penalized by the double tax. Depending on
controversial assumptions concerning the responsiveness of savings to
• • 89
tax incentives, it may be relatively easy to portray the burden of any
tax on capital (including the corporate tax or the estate tax) as
reducing capital formation and hence falling mainly on labor,
regardless of whether the economy is assumed to be open or closed.9 °
While the notion that the corporate tax is progressive, even if
distortionary, has come under increasing challenge recently, the
Treasury's revisionist incidence analysis should presumably be viewed
mainly from the perspective of politics rather than economics. If past
reform efforts are any guide, there will undoubtedly be considerable
political pressure to skew the incidence analysis to support competing
claims concerning the progressivity or regressivity of alternative
87 TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 53.
88 According to one recent study, more than half of the benefit of a $50 billion
annual reduction in corporate taxes would flow to the top 1% of households if the
corporate tax is borne entirely by owners of capital, while about one third of the
benefit would flow to the top 1% of households if the corporate tax is borne equally
by labor and owners of capital. See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES: WELL-DESIGNED, FISCALLY RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE TAX
REFORM COULD BENEFIT THE ECONOMY 14 (2008).
89 While the 2004 Economic Report of the President clearly relies on savings
effects for the argument that capital income taxes fall mainly on labor, the 2007
Economic Report of the President "simply asserts, without reference to theory or
empirical evidence, the view that the corporate income tax burden falls on labor
through savings effects." Gravelle, supra note 46, at 13; see id. at 6 n.3.
90 See Jane G. Gravelle & Kent A. Smetters, Does the Open Economy
Assumption Really Mean That Labor Bears the Burden of a Capital Income Tax?, 6
ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 33 (2006). Recent experience suggests that
countries tend to follow each other in reducing corporate taxes, in which case "the
closed-economy model is the right one to use." Arnold C. Harberger, Corporate Tax
Incidence: Reflections on What is Known, Unknown, and Unknowable, in
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 284, 301-302
(John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008); see id. at 301 (suggesting that
"the choice between an open and a closed economy is a matter of scenarios, not of
reality").
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reforms.9' Indeed, the distributional impact of the 1986 reforms and
the 1993 increase in the maximum corporate rate from 34% to 35%
would look quite different if labor were assumed to bear most of the
burden of the corporate tax. Moreover, a corporate tax cut that is not
accompanied by significant base broadening would ultimately need to
be paid for by increasing taxes or reducing spending. Thus, the
distributional effect of reducing the corporate tax rate cannot be
assessed without knowing how such a rate cut would ultimately be
financed. 92
C. Superiority of Rate Cuts and Base-Broadening
In very general terms, the Rangel proposal and the Treasury
reports suggest two competing options for corporate tax reform: if
existing corporate preferences are cut back, the revenue gain could be
used to reduce corporate tax rates or, alternatively, to provide
enhanced expensing of new investment. In terms of both equity and
efficiency, rate-cutting combined with base-broadening along the lines
of the 1986 Act may be viewed as the preferable approach. While the
current high statutory rates are quite distortionary, the U.S. corporate
tax raises comparatively little revenue. Lowering the corporate tax
rate would reduce the bias in favor of debt financing, investment in
noncorporate form, and shifting of corporate profits to low-tax
jurisdictions." Moreover, lowering the corporate tax rate would
discourage corporate tax shelters, thereby helping to finance rate cuts
and prevent further erosion of the corporate tax base. As the
European experience suggests, rate-cutting and base-broadening may
be the best means of preserving the corporate income tax as a
significant source of revenue.
By contrast, partial expensing without disallowing interest
deductions would invite massive sheltering that would undermine
both the individual and corporate tax bases. Allowing both expensing
and deductibility of interest would yield negative tax rates and
encourage debt-financed investments that would be uneconomic
91 See Gravelle & Smetters, supra note 90, at 1 (noting that the Joint Committee
on Taxation "avoided the incidence controversy altogether by ignoring the corporate
tax in its distributional analysis" of the 1986 Act).
92 See ARON-DINE, supra note 88, at 15 (concluding that low and middle-income
households would be hurt most if a corporate rate reduction were paid for by splitting
the financing cost equally among all households).
9' See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 43.
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before taking taxes into account.94 While expensing would exempt the
normal return from investment, a lower corporate tax rate would
reduce the burden on all corporate income, including supranormal
returns from risk-taking and innovation.95 Expensing would have little
effect on cross-border income-shifting, while lower corporate tax rates
would help to attract and retain highly profitable investments by
96multinational corporations. Indeed, the business community's
preference for lower corporate tax rates rather than enhanced
expensing may help to explain its tepid response to the 2005 Advisory
Panel's report.97 Given revenue constraints, the Treasury's expensing
approach would likely be politically unacceptable without limitations
on deductibility of interest on corporate debt. Thus, the business
community may perceive that the realistic choice is between lower
corporate tax rates coupled with continued deductibility of interest,
on the one hand, and expensing combined with disallowance of
interest deductions, on the other hand. Although expensing of
investment would provide a timing benefit, this immediate advantage
could be more than offset by higher deferred tax liabilities if corporate
tax rates were increased in the future.98
The Treasury's suggestion that "a larger [corporate] tax rate
reduction or greater partial expensing" could move the United States
94 See CBO, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME, supra note 14, at 10-11 (explaining that
introducing expensing without simultaneously eliminating interest deductions could
lead to negative effective tax rates of as high as 87.5% on debt-financed business
investments). Nevertheless, the Treasury considered that partial expensing would
likely not give rise to distortions sufficient "to warrant a substantial change in the tax
treatment of interest." TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 49 n.67.
95 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 135 (2008) ("In contrast to
expensing, a corporate tax rate cut lowers the tax on both normal and supra-normal
returns.").
96 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that a lower rate
would make the United States "a more attractive place in which to invest"); id. at 44
(noting that, unlike a rate cut, "partial expensing... [would not] reduce the tax
disincentive to repatriating foreign earnings").
97 See generally Graetz, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that "U.S. businesses will not
relish giving up their interest deductions in exchange for immediate expensing of
investments"); Tom Neubig, Where's the Applause? Why Most Corporations Prefer a
Lower Rate, 111 TAX NOTES 483 (Apr. 24, 2006). Because most intangibles are
already written off immediately, many businesses would derive no additional benefit
from more liberal expensing; moreover, businesses that expect supranormal returns
should generally prefer lower rates to exemption of the risk-free portion of
investment returns.
98 The assumption that expensing would exempt the normal investment return is
subject to the important caveat that tax rates remain constant.
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"from its current position as a high-tax rate country to a low-tax rate
country" suggests a painless solution that ignores the need for
tradeoffs and revenue concerns. 9 If the lobbying surrounding the 2003
tax cuts provides any lesson, it seems highly unrealistic to expect that
business would be willing to give up all existing tax preferences in
return for an across-the-board rate cut.10 Given revenue constraints,
business tax reform will inevitably create both winners and losers.
While there is clearly much room for base-broadening, it may be
necessary to secure additional sources of revenue to help finance a
significant reduction in corporate tax rates. Thus, corporate tax
reform might well provide another reason for introducing a low-rate
VAT, thereby reducing reliance on the individual income tax and
corporate tax and aligning the mix of U.S. taxes more closely to that
of other OECD countries.101 Given the demonstrated workability of
the VAT around the world, the United States should consider a low-
102
rate VAT to supplement the existing corporate tax. Retaining the
existing corporate tax alongside a low-rate VAT would avoid the need
to address a host of difficult and costly transition issues that would
arise if the existing corporate tax were replaced with a cash-flow
business tax.
There is a risk that the Administration's slogan of increased
corporate competitiveness may be used as a pretext for providing
additional tax cuts for high-income investors and business owners.
Echoing the notion that labor already bears most of the burden of the
99 TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 45. The Treasury's focus on high
statutory rates ignores the fact that the United States has a relatively narrow
corporate tax base.
100 The initial reaction to the Treasury's 2007 conference on competitiveness was
that it was "not possible or realistic" to eliminate the tax preferences on the
Treasury's hit list. Heidi Glenn, Business Leaders Would Give Up Tax Breaks for
Lower Rates, 116 TAx NOTES 324, 327 (July 30, 2007) (quoting Michael J. Boskin);
Joanne M. Weiner, U.S. Corporate Tax Reform: All Talk, No Action, 116 TAx NOTES
716 (Aug. 27, 2007).
101 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that the United
States "relies less heavily on general consumption taxes.., than all other OECD
countries" and is "the only OECD country without a VAT"); Graetz, supra note 13,
at 124-25 (suggesting that a low-level VAT would be essential to permit a reduction
in the corporate tax rate to 15-20%).
102 See Graetz, supra note 13, at 200-03 (proposing mix of taxes that would
include a low-level VAT as well as reformed corporate and estate taxes); id. at 82
(cautioning against "American exceptionalism" in tax reform). While the Treasury
considered replacing the U.S. corporate tax with a consumption-type "business
activities tax," there is no reason for the United States to invent novel forms of
consumption taxation. See.TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 19-42.
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corporate income tax, Glenn Hubbard, the former chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, has suggested recently that "workers
collectively would be better off if they voted for higher taxes on labor
with corresponding cuts in the corporate tax."10 3 Although the
underlying assumption may be that the benefits of lower corporate tax
rates and increased after-tax profits would trickle down to U.S.
workers, there is no guarantee that such a result would occur. In
assessing the realistic prospects of any business tax reform, it is
important to recognize that a robust corporate tax apparently remains
politically popular; indeed, the underlying uncertainty about who
bears the corporate tax burden "contributes to the public view that
the tax is probably paid by someone else."'0 4 Eliminating the
regressive 2003 tax cuts on dividends and capital gains would help to
pay for a modest reduction in corporate tax rates. In terms of business
tax reform, there appears to be an emerging consensus that rate-
cutting combined with base-broadening may be a more important goal
• . .• 105
than corporate integration.
V. CONCLUSION
By cutting dividend taxes without ensuring that corporate
earnings would be fully taxed, the Bush Administration "gave the
carrot away" and squandered its best opportunity for achieving
• • 106
corporate-shareholder integration. Although the 2003 tax cuts were
defended in terms of providing investor-level relief and eliminating
the unfairness of the double tax, current proposals would reduce the
tax burden at the corporate level. Shareholder-level relief cannot be
103 Hubbard, supra note 78.
104 Graetz, supra note 13, at 110.
105 Under the new view of dividends, the benefits of corporate-shareholder
integration are less significant than under the old view. See CBO, TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME, supra note 14, at 36 ("In essence, the double taxation of income derived
from corporate equity creates less of a distortion under the new view, so integration
would accomplish less."). In response to nondiscrimination concerns, many European
countries have recently adopted a partial-dividend exclusion approach in lieu of full
or partial shareholder credits for corporate taxes previously paid. See Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1208-12 (2006).
106 Gale & Orszag, supra note 41, at 1230 (noting that the dividend tax cut
"undermines the political viability of true corporate tax reform" because it fails to
"combine the carrot of addressing the 'double taxation' of dividends with the stick of
closing corporate loopholes and preferential tax provisions, to ensure that corporate
income is taxed once and only once-but at least once").
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divorced from reform of the corporate-level tax. Lower corporate tax
rates would lessen the economic gains from integration of corporate
and shareholder taxes, further undermining the argument for
extending the 2003 tax cuts. Allowing the 2003 tax cuts to sunset
would not only allow greater flexibility in reducing corporate tax rates
but would also curtail a costly and regressive windfall and help pay for
lower corporate tax rates. Since individual income tax rates may
significantly exceed the maximum corporate tax rate in the future,
there would be greater need to prevent use of corporations to shelter
individual income taxed at higher rates.
The Administration's piecemeal approach to business taxation
does not move in the direction of a well-designed consumption tax.
Enhanced expensing combined with continued deductibility of
interest would provide a strong incentive to use corporate debt
financing and open new tax shelter opportunlues. Noncorporate
business owners would have an incentive to use debt financing not
only to eliminate investment income but also to reduce taxes on
compensation. If the withering of the corporate tax is to be halted,
1986-style reform that combines the carrot of rate-cutting with the
stick of base-broadening seems to offer the most promising approach.
The United States would do well to follow the example of its major
competitors which have broadened their corporate tax bases and
lowered their corporate tax rates, thereby enhancing competitiveness
and preserving the corporate tax as a source of revenue. More
substantial reduction of the corporate tax rate may require additional
revenue sources such as a low-rate VAT that would also help to
finance other needed reforms, including reform of the AMT. In an era
of escalating and intractable budget deficits, reducing corporate tax
rates without replacing the lost revenue is no longer a realistic option.
107 For an alternative corporate tax reform that would eliminate the debt-equity
distinction, see generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS
INCOME TAX (2007) (proposing "business enterprise income tax" (BELT) that would
allow cost of capital allowance and depreciation deductions). See also Alvin C.
Warren, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A First Appraisal, 118 TAX NOTES 921
(Feb. 25, 2008). By taxing supranormal returns at the corporate level and normal
returns at the investor level, the BEIT potentially offers an attractive model of
corporate-shareholder integration. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Why the BElT
Proposal Shouldn't Be Discounted," 118 TAX NOTES 1048 (Mar. 3, 2008).
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